

# An adverse selection approach to power tarification

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
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Work in progress with C.Alasseur, I.Ekeland, R.Élie and D.Possamaï  
as part of PhD thesis: "Contributions to the Principal-Agent theory"


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- 1 Problem and Model
- 2 Agent's problem
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An electricity company wants to determine the optimal tariff  $p(t, c)$  of the electrical consumption for its clients.



From the game theory point of view, the Company and the Client play a Non-zero sum Stackelberg game.



- $K : [0, T] \times \mathcal{C} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$  is the cost of production of electricity for the Principal. ( $K(t, c)$ )
  - $t \mapsto K(t, c)$  is continuous  $\forall c$ .
  - $c \mapsto K(t, c)$  is  $C^1(\mathcal{C})$ , increasing and strictly convex  $\forall t$ .

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  - $c \mapsto K(t, c)$  is  $C^1(\mathcal{C})$ , increasing and strictly convex  $\forall t$ .
- $x$  is the Agent's type, taking values in some set  $X \subset \mathbb{R}$ .
- $f : X \longrightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$  is the density of the Agent's type on  $X$ .
  - $f$  is known by the Principal.

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- $u : [0, T] \times X \times \mathcal{C} \longrightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is the utility function of the Agents.  $(u(t, x, c))$ 
  - $u$  is jointly continuous.
  - $c \mapsto u(t, x, c)$  is non-decreasing and concave for every  $(t, x)$ .
  - $c \mapsto \frac{\partial u}{\partial x}(t, x, c)$  is invertible.

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  - u-convexity
  - Solving the Agent's problem
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Given  $p \in \mathcal{P}$ , the problem of the Agent of type  $x \in X$  is

$$U_A(p, x) := \sup_c \int_0^T u(t, x, c(t)) - p(t, c(t)) \, dt.$$

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### Definition 1

Let  $\varphi$  be a map from  $[0, T] \times \mathcal{C}$  to  $\mathbb{R}$ . The  $u$ -transform  $\varphi^* : [0, T] \times X \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \cup \{+\infty\}$ , is defined by

$$\varphi^*(t, x) := \sup_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \{u(t, x, c) - \varphi(t, c)\}, \text{ for any } (t, x) \in [0, T] \times X.$$

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Similarly, if  $\psi$  is a map from  $[0, T] \times X$  to  $\mathbb{R}$ , its  $u$ -transform  $\psi^* : [0, T] \times \mathcal{C} \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \cup \{+\infty\}$  is defined by

$$\psi^*(t, c) := \sup_{x \in X} \{u(t, x, c) - \psi(t, x)\}, \text{ for any } (t, c) \in [0, T] \times \mathcal{C}.$$

## Definition 2

A map  $\varphi : [0, T] \times \mathcal{C} \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \cup \{+\infty\}$  is said to be  $u$ -convex if it is proper and if there exists some  $\psi : [0, T] \times X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  such that

$$\varphi(t, c) = \psi^*(t, c), \text{ for any } (t, c) \in [0, T] \times \mathcal{C}.$$

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## Proposition 1

A map  $\varphi : [0, T] \times \mathcal{C} \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \cup \{+\infty\}$  is  $u$ -convex if and only if

$$\varphi(t, c) = (\varphi^*)^*(t, c), \text{ for any } (t, c) \in [0, T] \times \mathcal{C}.$$

$\implies$  If  $p$  is  $u$ -convex it can be recovered from  $p^*$ .

### Definition 3

Let  $\psi : [0, T] \times X \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \cup \{+\infty\}$  be a  $u$ -convex function. For any  $(t, x) \in [0, T] \times X$ , the  $u$ -subdifferential of  $\psi$  at the point  $(t, x)$  is the set

$$\partial^* \psi(t, x) := \{c \in \mathcal{C}, \psi^*(t, c) = u(t, x, c) - \psi(t, x)\}.$$

### Definition 4

A tariff  $p : [0, T] \times \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is **admissible** if

- $p$  is a  $u$ -convex function.
- $\partial^* p^*(t, x)$  is non-empty for every  $(t, x)$ .
- $x \mapsto p^*(t, x) \in W^{1,m}(0, 1)$ , for a.e.  $t$ .

We denote by  $\mathcal{P}$  the set of admissible tariffs.

For every  $p \in \mathcal{P}$  the agent has a unique optimal response:

$$p^*(t, x) = u(t, x, c^*) - p(t, c^*), \text{ for every } c^* \in \partial^* p^*(t, x).$$

$$\implies \frac{\partial u}{\partial x}(t, x, c^*) = \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial x}(t, x), \text{ for every } c^* \in \partial^* p^*(t, x), \quad (1)$$

$$\implies c^*(t, x) = \left( \frac{\partial u}{\partial x}(t, x, \cdot) \right)^{(-1)} \left( \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial x}(t, x) \right). \quad (2)$$

Obs: (1)  $\implies p^*$  is **increasing** in  $x$ .



## Proposition 2

*For every  $p \in \mathcal{P}$  and for almost every  $x \in X$ , we have*

$$U_A(p, x) = \int_0^T p^*(t, x) dt,$$

*and the optimal consumption of Agents is given by (2).*

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The set of agents who accept the contract

$$X^*(p^*) := \left\{ x \in X, P^*(x) := \int_0^T p^*(t, x) dt \geq H(x) \right\}.$$

The principal's problem is

$$U_P := \sup_{p \in \mathcal{P}} \int_0^T \left[ \int_{X^*(p^*)} p(t, c^*(t, x)) f(x) dx - K \left( t, \int_{X^*(p^*)} c^*(t, x) f(x) dx \right) \right] dt.$$

We solve actually  $\tilde{U}_P \geq U_P$  where we drop the  $u$ -convexity of  $p$ .

$$\tilde{U}_P = \sup_{C^+} \int_0^T \left[ \int_{X^*(p^*)} p(t, c^*(t, x)) f(x) dx - K \left( t, \int_{X^*(p^*)} c^*(t, x) f(x) dx \right) \right] dt.$$

with  $C^+$  is the space of maps  $g : [0, T] \times X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  such that

- $x \mapsto g(t, x) \in W^{1,m}(0, 1)$ , for a.e.  $t$ .
- $x \mapsto g(t, x)$  is non-decreasing.

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  - constant  $H$
  - general  $H$

We consider  $X = [0, 1]$ , and

$$u(t, x, c) = g(x)\phi(t)\frac{c^\gamma}{\gamma},$$

- $g : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$  continuous and non-decreasing.
- $\phi : [0, T] \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+^*$  continuous.
- $\gamma \in (0, 1)$ .

The response of the agent (2) can be written as

$$c^*(t, x) = \left( \frac{\gamma}{\phi(t) g'(x)} \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial x}(t, x) \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}.$$

The principal's problem in terms of  $p^*$  is

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{U}_P = \sup_{p^* \in C^+} \int_0^T & \left[ \int_{X^*(p^*)} \left( \frac{g(x)}{g'(x)} \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial x}(t, x) - p^*(t, x) \right) f(x) dx \right. \\ & \left. - K \left( t, \int_{X^*(p^*)} \left( \frac{\gamma}{\phi(t) g'(x)} \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial x}(t, x) \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} f(x) dx \right) \right] dt. \quad (3) \end{aligned}$$

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Recall that

$$X^*(p^*) = \{x \in [0, 1] : P^*(x) \geq H(x)\}.$$

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We study 3 cases for the reservation utility of the agents

- 1)  $H$  is constant.
- 2)  $H$  is strictly concave.
- 3)  $H$  is constant-linear.

1)  $H$  is constant. In this case  $X^*$  is an interval  $[x_0, 1]$ .

$$X^*(p^*) = \{x \in [0, 1], P^*(x) \geq H\}.$$




Figure :  $X^*(p^*)$  for constant  $H$ .

We solve the equivalent formulation of (3)

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{U}_P = \sup_{x_0 \in [0,1]} \sup_{p^* \in C^+(x_0)} \int_0^T \left[ \int_{x_0}^1 \left( \frac{g(x)}{g'(x)} \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial x}(t, x) - p^*(t, x) \right) f(x) dx \right. \\ \left. - K \left( t, \int_{x_0}^1 \left( \frac{\gamma}{\phi(t)g'(x)} \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial x}(t, x) \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} f(x) dx \right) \right] dt, \quad (4) \end{aligned}$$

with

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i.e.

$$C^+(x_0) = \left\{ p^* \in C^+ : \int_0^T p^*(t, x_0) dt = H \right\},$$

is a **closed and convex** set.

Which is equivalent, by [integration by parts](#), to

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{U}_P = \sup_{x_0 \in [0,1]} \sup_{p^* \in C^+(x_0)} & \int_0^T \left[ \int_{x_0}^1 \frac{(g(x)f(x) + g'(x)F(x) - g'(x))}{g'(x)} \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial x}(t, x) dx \right. \\ & \left. - K \left( t, \int_{x_0}^1 \left( \frac{\gamma}{\phi(t)g'(x)} \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial x}(t, x) \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} f(x) dx \right) \right] dt \\ & + (F(x_0) - 1)H. \end{aligned}$$

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We solve the following [convex optimization](#) problem

$$(P_{x_0}) \sup_{p^* \in C^+(x_0)} \Psi_{x_0}(p^*).$$

Sufficient and necessary optimality condition

$$\Psi'_{x_0}(p^*; q) \leq 0, \quad \forall q \in T_{C+(x_0)}(p^*).$$

$$\implies \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial x}(t, x) = \left( \frac{\phi(t)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} [g(x)f(x) + g'(x)F(x) - g'(x)]^+}{f(x) \frac{\partial K}{\partial c}(t, A(t, x_0))} \right)^{\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}} \frac{g'(x)}{\gamma},$$

for a continuous map  $A$ .



The problem reduces to

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{U}_P = \sup_{x_0 \in [0,1]} \int_0^T & \left( \frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{\phi^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}}(t) \ell(x_0)}{\left(\frac{\partial K}{\partial c}(t, A(t, x_0))\right)^{\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}}} - K \left( t, \frac{\phi^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}}(t) \ell(x_0)}{\left(\frac{\partial K}{\partial c}(t, A(t, x_0))\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}}} \right) \right) dt \\ & + (F(x_0) - 1)H, \end{aligned}$$

for a continuous function  $\ell \implies$  it **attains its maximum** at some  $x_0^*$ .

## Theorem 5

The maximum in  $\tilde{U}_P$  is attained for the map

$$p^*(t, x) = H + \int_{x_0^*}^x g'(y) \left( \frac{\phi(t)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} [g(y)f(y) + g'(y)F(y) - g'(y)]^+}{\gamma^{\frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma}} f(y) \frac{\partial K}{\partial c}(t, A(t, x_0^*))} \right)^{\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}} dy.$$

Define then  $p$  for any  $(t, c) \in [0, T] \times \mathbb{R}_+$  by

$$p(t, c) = \sup_{x \in [0, 1]} \left\{ g(x) \phi(t) \frac{c^\gamma}{\gamma} - p^*(t, x) \right\}.$$

If  $p^*$  is  $u$ -convex, then  $p$  is the optimal tariff for the problem  $U_P$ . Furthermore, the Principal only signs contracts with the Agents of type  $x \in [x_0^*, 1]$ .




Figure :  $X^*(p^*) = [x_0^*, 1]$ .

The company prefers the individuals who can pay more.

2)  $H$  is not constant. To avoid complex forms of  $X^*$ , we assume that

$$\frac{g'(x)}{g(x)} \geq \frac{H'(x)}{H(x)}.$$

Under this assumption we have the following result

### Proposition 3

Let  $p^* \in C^+$  be any function such that the set

$$Y^*(p^*) := \left\{ x \in [0, 1], \int_0^T p^*(t, x) dt = H(x) \right\},$$

has positive Lebesgue measure. Then  $p^*$  is *not optimal* for problem  $\tilde{U}_P$ .

Thanks to the previous proposition we can **redefine**  $C^+$  with the additional condition that the measure of  $Y^*(p^*)$  is zero. For these functions, we define

$$\widehat{X}^*(p^*) := X^*(p^*) \setminus Y^*(p^*) = \{x \in [0, 1], P^*(x) > H(x)\},$$

which is an **open** subset of  $[0, 1]$ .

$$\implies \widehat{X}^*(p^*) = [0, b_0) \cup \bigcup_{n \geq 1} (a_n, b_n) \cup (a_0, 1],$$

with  $a_0 \in (0, 1]$ ,  $b_0 \in [0, 1)$ , and  $b_0 \leq a_{n+1} \leq b_{n+1} \leq a_0$ , for every  $n \geq 0$ . We denote  $a := (a_n)_{n \geq 0}$ ,  $b := (b_n)_{n \geq 0}$  and define  $\mathcal{A}$  as the set of such that pairs  $(a, b)$ .

The equivalent formulation we solve is

$$\sup_{(a,b) \in \mathcal{A}} \sup_{p^* \in C^+(a,b)} \int_0^T \left[ \int_{X^*(a,b)} \left( \frac{g(x)}{g'(x)} \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial x}(t,x) - p^*(t,x) \right) f(x) dx \right. \\ \left. - K \left( t, \int_{X^*(a,b)} \left( \frac{\gamma}{\phi(t)g'(x)} \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial x}(t,x) \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} f(x) dx \right) \right] dt,$$

where

$$C^+(a,b) = \left\{ p^* \in C^+ : \widehat{X}^*(p^*) = [0, b_0) \cup \bigcup_{n \geq 1} (a_n, b_n) \cup (a_0, 1] \right\}.$$

By integration this can be re-written as

$$\sup_{(a,b) \in \mathcal{A}} \sup_{p^* \in C^+(a,b)} \Psi_{(a,b)}(p^*), \quad (5)$$

with

$$\begin{aligned} \Psi_{(a,b)}(p^*) := & \int_0^T \int_0^{b_0} \frac{(g(x)f(x) + g'(x)F(x))}{g'(x)} \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial x}(t, x) dx dt \\ & + \int_0^T \int_{a_0}^1 \frac{(g(x)f(x) + g'(x)F(x) - g'(x))}{g'(x)} \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial x}(t, x) dx dt \\ & + \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \int_0^T \int_{a_n}^{b_n} \frac{(g(x)f(x) + g'(x)F(x))}{g'(x)} \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial x}(t, x) dx dt \\ & - K \left( t, \int_{X^*(a,b)} \left( \frac{\gamma}{\phi(t)g'(x)} \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial x}(t, x) \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} f(x) dx \right) dt \\ & + \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} F(a_n)H(a_n) - \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} F(b_n)H(b_n) - F(b_0)H(b_0) + (F(a_0) - 1)H(a_0). \end{aligned}$$

For fixed  $(a, b) \in \mathcal{A}$ , we consider the problem

$$(P_{a,b}) \quad \sup_{p^* \in C^+(a,b)} \Psi_{(a,b)}(p^*).$$

Since the set  $C^+(a, b)$  is very complicated, we need to do local perturbations to obtain optimality conditions providing valuable information.



## Theorem 6

Let  $p^*$  be the solution of  $(P_{a,b})$ . Then for every  $x \in X^*(a,b)$ , if  $P^*(x) > H(x)$

$$\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial x}(t, x) = \begin{cases} \left( \frac{\phi(t)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} [g(x)f(x) + g'(x)F(x)]^+}{f(x) \frac{\partial K}{\partial c}(t, A(t, a, b))} \right)^{\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}} \frac{g'(x)}{\gamma}, & \text{if } x \in (0, b_0) \cup \bigcup_n (a_n, b_n), \\ \left( \frac{\phi(t)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} [g(x)f(x) + g'(x)F(x) - g'(x)]^+}{f(x) \frac{\partial K}{\partial c}(t, A(t, a, b))} \right)^{\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}} \frac{g'(x)}{\gamma}, & \text{if } x \in (a_0, 1), \end{cases}$$

for a continuous function  $A$ .

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for a continuous function  $A$ .

Since the optimization over  $\mathcal{A}$  can be extremely difficult, we assume that the following maps

$$v_1(x) := g'(x) \left( \frac{[g(x)f(x) + g'(x)F(x)]^+}{f(x)} \right)^{\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}},$$

$$v_2(x) := g'(x) \left( \frac{[g(x)f(x) + g'(x)F(x) - g'(x)]^+}{f(x)} \right)^{\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}},$$

are **non-decreasing** on  $[0, 1]$ .

$\implies$  the optimal  $P^*$  is convex on intervals where  $P^* > H$ .

2.1)  $H$  is strictly concave.




Figure :  $\hat{X}^*(p^*)$  for strictly concave  $H$ .

$$\implies \hat{X}^*(p^*) = [0, b_0) \cup (a_0, 1], \quad 0 \leq b_0 \leq a_0 \leq 1.$$

Define the set

$$\mathcal{A}_2 := \{(a, b) \in [0, 1]^2, b \leq a\}.$$

Problem (5) reduces to

$$\sup_{(a_0, b_0) \in \mathcal{A}_2} \int_0^T \left[ \frac{\phi(t)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} \ell(a_0, b_0)}{\gamma \left( \frac{\partial K}{\partial c}(t, A(t, a_0, b_0)) \right)^{\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}}} - K \left( t, \frac{\phi(t)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} \ell(a_0, b_0)}{\left( \frac{\partial K}{\partial c}(t, A(t, a_0, b_0)) \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}}} \right) \right] dt + \theta(a_0, b_0).$$

Where  $\ell$  and  $\theta$  are **continuous** on  $[0, 1]^2$  so the supremum over the compact set above is attained at some  $(a_0^*, b_0^*) \in \mathcal{A}_2$ .

## Theorem 7

If the following holds

$$H(b_0^*) - \frac{\phi(t)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}}}{\gamma \left( \frac{\partial K}{\partial c}(t, A(t, a_0^*, b_0^*)) \right)^{\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}}} \int_0^{b_0^*} v_1(y) dy > H(0), \quad t \in [0, T],$$

the maximum in (5) is attained for the map

$$p^*(t, x) = \begin{cases} H(b_0^*) - \frac{\phi(t)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}}}{\gamma \left( \frac{\partial K}{\partial c}(t, A(t, a_0^*, b_0^*)) \right)^{\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}}} \int_x^{b_0^*} v_1(y) dy, & \text{if } x \in [0, b_0^*), \\ \tilde{p}^*(t, x) < H(x), & \text{if } x \in [b_0^*, a_0^*], \\ H(a_0^*) + \frac{\phi(t)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}}}{\gamma \left( \frac{\partial K}{\partial c}(t, A(t, a_0^*, b_0^*)) \right)^{\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}}} \int_{a_0^*}^x v_2(y) dy, & \text{if } x \in (a_0^*, 1]. \end{cases}$$

## Theorem 7

Otherwise, it is attained for

$$p^*(t, x) = \begin{cases} \tilde{p}^*(t, x) < H(x), & \text{if } x \in [0, a_0^*], \\ H(a_0^*) + \frac{\phi(t)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}}}{\gamma \left(\frac{\partial K}{\partial c}(t, A(t, a_0^*, b_0^*))\right)^{\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}}} \int_{a_0^*}^x v_2(y) dy, & \text{if } x \in (a_0^*, 1]. \end{cases}$$

Define then  $p$ , for any  $(t, c) \in [0, T] \times \mathbb{R}_+$ , by

$$p(t, c) := \sup_{x \in [0, 1]} \left\{ g(x) \phi(t) \frac{c^\gamma}{\gamma} - p^*(t, x) \right\}.$$

If  $p^*$  is  $u$ -convex, then  $p$  is the optimal tariff for the problem  $U_P$ . Furthermore, the Principal only signs contracts with the Agents of type  $x \in [0, b_0^*] \cup [a_0^*, 1]$  in the first case and with the Agents of type  $x \in [a_0^*, 1]$  in the second case.




Figure :  $\hat{X}^*(p^*)$  for strictly concave  $H$ .



The company prefers the individuals who can pay more and the ones who are not so difficult to satisfy.



2.2)  $H$  is constant-linear.

$$H(x) = \begin{cases} \beta, & \text{if } x \in [0, x_h], \\ \alpha(x - x_h) + \beta, & \text{if } x \in [x_h, 1], \end{cases}$$

where  $\alpha, \beta \geq 0$  and where  $x_h \in [0, 1]$ .

(a)  $a_1 = 0$ .(b)  $a_1 > 0$ .Figure :  $X^*(p^*)$  for a "constant-linear"  $H$ .

$$\implies X^*(p^*) = [a_1, a_2] \cup [a_3, 1], \quad 0 \leq a_1 \leq x_h \leq a_2 \leq a_3 \leq 1.$$

Let us then define the set

$$\mathcal{A}_3 := \{(a, b, c) \in [0, 1]^3, a \leq x_h \leq b \leq c\}.$$

Problem (5) becomes

$$\sup_{(a_1, a_2, a_3) \in \mathcal{A}_3} \int_0^T \left[ \frac{\phi(t)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} \ell(a_1, a_2, a_3)}{\gamma \left( \frac{\partial K}{\partial c}(t, A(t, a_1, a_2, a_3)) \right)^{\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}}} - K \left( t, \frac{\phi(t)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} \ell(a_1, a_2, a_3)}{\left( \frac{\partial K}{\partial c}(t, A(t, a_1, a_2, a_3)) \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}}} \right) \right] dt + \theta(a_1, a_2, a_3),$$

for some continuous maps  $A$ ,  $\theta$  and  $\ell$ .

Merci de votre attention!

## Appendix.

For every  $(t, x_0) \in [0, T] \times [0, 1]$

$$A(t, x_0) = g_K^{(-1)} \left( \phi^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}}(t) \int_{x_0}^1 \left( \frac{[g_\gamma(x)f(x) + g'_\gamma(x)F(x) - g'_\gamma(x)]^+}{f^\gamma(x)} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} dx \right),$$

$$g_K(c) := c \left( \frac{\partial K}{\partial c}(t, c) \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}}, \quad c \geq 0,$$

and

$$\ell(x_0) := \int_{x_0}^1 \left( \frac{[g(x)f(x) + g'(x)F(x) - g'(x)]^+}{f^\gamma(x)} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} dx.$$

For any  $(t, a_0, b_0) \in [0, T] \times \mathcal{A}_2$

$$A(t, a_0, b_0) := g_K^{(-1)} \left( \phi(t)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} \int_0^{b_0} \left( \frac{[g(x)f(x) + g'(x)F(x)]^+}{f^\gamma(x)} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} dx \right. \\ \left. + \phi(t)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} \int_{a_0}^1 \left( \frac{[g(x)f(x) + g'(x)F(x) - g'(x)]^+}{f^\gamma(x)} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} dx \right),$$

$$\ell(a_0, b_0) := \int_0^{b_0} \left( \frac{[g(x)f(x) + g'(x)F(x)]^+}{f^\gamma(x)} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} dx \\ + \int_{a_0}^1 \left( \frac{[g(x)f(x) + g'(x)F(x) - g'(x)]^+}{f^\gamma(x)} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} dx,$$

$$\theta(a_0, b_0) := -F(b_0)H(b_0) + (F(a_0) - 1)H(a_0).$$

For any  $(t, a_1, a_2, a_3) \in [0, T] \times \mathcal{A}_3$

$$\begin{aligned} \ell(a_1, a_2, a_3) &:= \int_{a_1}^{a_2} \left( \frac{[g(x)f(x) + g'(x)F(x)]^+}{f^\gamma(x)} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} dx \\ &\quad + \int_{a_3}^1 \left( \frac{[g(x)f(x) + g'(x)F(x) - g'(x)]^+}{f^\gamma(x)} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} dx, \end{aligned}$$

$$\theta(a_1, a_2, a_3) := F(a_1)H(a_1) - F(a_2)H(a_2) + (F(a_3) - 1)H(a_3),$$

$$\begin{aligned} A(t, a_1, a_2, a_3) &:= g_K^{(-1)} \left( \phi(t)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} \int_{a_1}^{a_2} \left( \frac{[g(x)f(x) + g'(x)F(x)]^+}{f^\gamma(x)} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} dx \right. \\ &\quad \left. + \phi(t)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} \int_{a_3}^1 \left( \frac{[g(x)f(x) + g'(x)F(x) - g'(x)]^+}{f^\gamma(x)} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} dx \right). \end{aligned}$$

## Theorem 8

Let  $f(x) = 1$ ,  $g(x) = x$  and the cost function  $K$  be given, for some  $n > 1$ , by

$$K(t, c) := k(t) \frac{c^n}{n}.$$

Then, the optimal tariff  $p \in \mathcal{P}$  is given for any  $(t, c) \in [0, T] \times \mathbb{R}_+$  by

$$p(t, c) = \begin{cases} \phi(t) \frac{c^\gamma}{\gamma} + M(t) \left( (2x_0^* - 1)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} - 1 \right) - h(t), & \text{if } c > \left( \frac{2\gamma M(t)}{(1-\gamma)\phi(t)} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}, \\ \phi(t) \frac{c^\gamma}{2\gamma} + c \left( \left( \frac{\phi(t)}{2} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} \frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma M(t)} \right)^{\frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma}} - h(t) + M(t)(2x_0^* - 1)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}}, & \text{if not,} \end{cases}$$

$$\text{where } M(t) = \frac{1-\gamma}{2\gamma} \left( \frac{2(2-\gamma)}{1-\gamma} \right)^{\frac{\gamma(n-1)}{n-\gamma}} \left( \frac{\phi^n(t)}{k^\gamma(t)} \right)^{\frac{1}{n-\gamma}} \left( 1 - (2x_0^* - 1)^{\frac{2-\gamma}{1-\gamma}} \right)^{-\frac{\gamma(n-1)}{n-\gamma}},$$

and where  $x_0^*$  is the **unique** solution in  $(1/2, 1)$  of the equation

$$\int_0^T h(t) dt = 2nA(T) \frac{2-\gamma}{n-\gamma} (2x_0^* - 1)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} \left( 1 - (2x_0^* - 1)^{\frac{2-\gamma}{1-\gamma}} \right)^{-\frac{\gamma(n-1)}{n-\gamma}}.$$

Furthermore, only the Agents of type  $x \geq x_0^*$  will accept the contract.